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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Union representing certain employees at Akers 
National Roll Company (the ―Company‖) appeals from a 
                                              

 Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by 
designation. 
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judgment entered on March 13, 2012 by the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The 
District Court vacated an award issued by Arbitrator Richard 
D. Sambuco (the ―Arbitrator‖), granted the Company‘s 
motion for summary judgment, and denied the Union‘s 
motion for summary judgment.  
 
In 2009, the Union submitted three grievances on 
behalf of Company employee and Union member Nelson 
Lubik, alleging that the Company violated a ―past practice‖ 
by failing to schedule Lubik, a maintenance clerk, for 
Saturday overtime when the maintenance department was 
scheduled to work. After the Arbitrator sustained the three 
grievances and ordered the Company to pay Lubik back 
wages for the missed overtime, the Company sued to vacate 
the Arbitrator‘s award. The District Court vacated the award 
because it concluded that the award did not ―draw its 
essence‖ from the Collective Bargaining Agreement (the 
―CBA‖ or ―Agreement‖); it reached this conclusion after 
determining that the plain language of the CBA 
―unambiguously‖ gave the Company the exclusive right to 
schedule its workforce. Because we disagree with the District 
Court‘s reasoning and its conclusion, we will reverse the 
District Court‘s judgment and will order enforcement of the 
Arbitrator‘s award. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
  
 The Company runs a manufacturing plant in 
Avonmore, Pennsylvania, and the Union is the exclusive 
collective-bargaining representative for clerical and technical 
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employees at the plant. From September 1, 2008 through 
February 29, 2012, the Company and the Union were parties 
to a CBA. The CBA included a multi-step grievance 
resolution procedure to be used when the Union and the 
Company disagreed over ―interpretation or application of, or 
compliance with the provisions‖ of the CBA. App. 31. Under 
the CBA, unresolved grievances were submitted to 
arbitration.  
 
 In February and March of 2009, the Union submitted 
three grievances on behalf of Lubik, alleging that the 
Company violated the CBA by directing Lubik not to work 
Saturday shifts on February 14, February 28, and March 7, 
when employees of the maintenance department were 
scheduled to work. In the first grievance, the Union stated 
that the nature of the grievance was ―Past Practice, the 
maintenance clerk has always worked when the Maintenance 
Department works whether full or partial crew.‖ Id. at 65. 
Because Lubik would have been eligible for overtime pay if 
he had worked on a Saturday alongside maintenance 
department employees, the Union alleged that the Company 
should be liable to pay Lubik at the overtime rate for the 
hours he was not scheduled to work. Id. 
 
 Per the grievance resolution procedure, the Company 
submitted answers to the Union‘s allegations. Regarding the 
first grievance, the Company asserted that there was no 
violation of the CBA because the ―Company has the right to 
schedule under Section 3 . . . of the Labor Agreement,‖ 
because the CBA ―does not recognize the existence of ‗past 
practice‘ in an[y] form,‖ and because ―[t]he notion of a ‗past 
practice‘ cannot undo or supersede clear contract language[;] 
Section 3 is very clear.‖ Id. at 66. The Company additionally 
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asserted that ―Section 2 – Scope of the Agreement [] states 
that any agreements must be put in writing and signed by the 
union designate and the company.‖ Id. 
 
 The Company submitted answers to the second and 
third grievances as well, and its final answer stated that its 
position had not changed since its answer to the first 
grievance, ―cit[ing] Section 2, Section 3 and all other relevant 
sections in support of its scheduling.‖ Id. at 70. The final 
answer also referred to a ―Section 9 D (C) page 20‖ in 
response to Lubik‘s grievance. The CBA does not contain a 
Section 9(D)(C), though, and page 20 contains portions of 
Section 8, ―Rates of Pay,‖ which does not appear to be 
relevant to the instant dispute. 
 
The Company and the Union ultimately submitted the 
three grievances to arbitration per the CBA. 
 
B. 
 
Because provisions of the CBA command our attention 
in deciding this case, we set forth the following relevant 
sections thereof. 
 
 Section 3 of the CBA, entitled ―Management‖ and 
referred to as the ―management rights clause,‖ reads as 
follows: 
 
 1. The Company retains the exclusive 
rights to manage the business and plant and to 
direct the working forces. The Company, in the 
exercise of its rights, shall observe the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
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 2. The rights to manage the business and 
plant and to direct the working forces includes 
the right to hire, suspend or discharge for proper 
cause, or transfer, and the right to relieve 
employees from duty because of lack of work or 
for other legitimate reasons. 
 
Id. at 29. 
 
 Section 9 of the CBA is entitled ―Hours of Work.‖ 
Two provisions of that Section are relevant to our analysis, 
Sections 9(A)(1) and 9(B)(1), which read as follows: 
 
A. Normal Hours of Work 
 1. The normal workweek shall be 40 
hours per week, scheduled on five successive 
days, from Monday through Friday, inclusive. 
 
B. Scheduling 
 1. If an employee is requested to report 
to work outside his regularly scheduled 
workweek and whether or not work is available 
he shall receive a minimum of 4 hours reporting 
pay at the employee‘s applicable rate of pay. 
 
Id. at 38. 
 
 Section 2 is entitled ―Scope of the Agreement.‖ Within 
Section 2 is a paragraph referred to by the parties as a ―zipper 
clause,‖ which reads as follows: 
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Agreements for the plant will only be 
recognized if they are in writing and signed by 
the designate of the International, and the 
Negotiating Committee; provided, however, 
that any such agreements may be terminated by 
either party upon 30 days written notice to the 
other party. 
 
Id. at 28.  
 
C. 
 
 On June 17, 2010, the Union and the Company 
participated in a hearing before the Arbitrator, and they 
―stipulated that the case being heard included three (3) 
grievances, all involving the same issue.‖ Id. at 70. The 
Union and the Company presented their contentions and 
supporting evidence to the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator‘s award 
contains a section that summarizes the positions of the parties 
as presented at the arbitration hearing. Id. at 86-89. The thrust 
of the Union‘s argument was that a past practice had been 
established, and that a written, signed agreement was not 
required for its establishment. Id. at 87. The Union presented 
evidence in support of its argument, including the testimony 
of Lubik as well as exhibits detailing the maintenance 
department‘s work schedule from 2008-2010, along with 
payroll records for Lubik. Id. at 72-83. From this evidence, it 
was apparent that Lubik had worked weekend shifts along 
with the maintenance department employees even on 
weekends when he had not been formally scheduled to work, 
and that he had been paid overtime for that work. This 
practice concluded in 2009, leading to the Union‘s first 
grievance. 
8 
 
 The Company argued that there was no past practice in 
its Agreement with the Union, because its zipper clause, 
located at Section 2 of the CBA, precluded a finding of past 
practice. It argued also that the CBA‘s Section 3 management 
rights clause included the right to schedule, that any 
modifying agreement would have to be in writing, and that 
the past practice agreement had never been reduced to 
writing.  
 
 In a decision that is now the subject of some dispute 
between the parties, the Arbitrator determined that he had to 
decide the following issue: 
 
Did the Parties to the Agreement as alleged in 
Grievance No. 2-2009 establish, by their actions 
in the year 2008, an unwritten past practice and 
did the Company violate this past practice? If 
the answer is yes, what is the remedy? 
 
Id. at 84.  
 
D. 
 
 On July 17, 2010, the Arbitrator issued an award 
sustaining Lubik‘s grievances and awarding him $5,477.08 in 
back wages, as well as the amounts Lubik would have earned 
in profit sharing in 2009 and 2010 had he worked on 
weekends that the maintenance department was scheduled to 
work. The Arbitrator cited several provisions of the CBA, 
including Section 3‘s management rights clause. He did not 
cite to or refer to Section 9, the ―Hours of Work‖ section. He 
focused his analysis and discussion on whether a past practice 
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had in fact been established, and whether Section 2‘s zipper 
clause prohibited a finding of past practice.  
 
 The Arbitrator concluded that the zipper clause failed 
to prohibit a finding of past practice, because it ―does not 
acknowledge that the written contract constitutes the parties‘ 
entire agreement, is not explicit with regard to a waiver of the 
right to bargain about other conditions, nor is it a specific 
affirmation that management rights are not limited by prior 
practices.‖ Id. at 91. The Arbitrator determined also that the 
language of the zipper clause was ambiguous, because its 
language appeared to indicate that an agreement that would 
satisfy the zipper clause would only require signature by the 
Union and not by the Company. Id. at 100. In addition, he 
described the characteristics of a binding past practice, 
including such factors as clarity, consistency, longevity, 
repetition, acceptability, underlying circumstances, and 
mutuality. Id. at 94-95. 
 
 The Arbitrator concluded that a binding past practice 
had been established when, in 2008, Lubik was permitted to 
work on weekends when his name did not appear in the work 
schedule. The Arbitrator noted that this practice occurred 
under two different maintenance managers, prior to and after 
adoption of the 2008-2012 CBA. Id. at 96. He noted also that 
the mutuality requirement was met because ―the parties, by 
virtue of their constant response to a recurring set of 
circumstances, resulted in a mutually accepted way of doing 
things that culminated into a past practice that carried over 
into the present Collective Bargaining Agreement . . . .‖ Id. at 
102. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union and the 
Company did establish a past practice that the Company 
violated when Lubik was not allowed to work along with the 
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maintenance department employees on weekends. 
Accordingly, the Arbitrator sustained Lubik‘s grievances and 
awarded him back wages and profit sharing. 
 
E. 
 
 The Company then filed suit to vacate the Arbitrator‘s 
award, alleging that the award ―ignores [the Company‘s] 
exclusive and express right to direct the workforce and to 
schedule overtime and therefore fails to draw its essence from 
the [CBA].‖ Id. at 23. In addition to citing Section 3‘s 
management rights clause, the Company cited to Section 9, 
―Hours of Work.‖ Id. at 22. The Company alleged also that 
the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction under the CBA by 
ignoring the CBA‘s clear provisions regarding the Company‘s 
right to direct the workforce and schedule overtime, and that 
the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing an award that 
impermissibly modifies the CBA. Id. at 24.  
 
 The Company and the Union filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The District Court granted the 
Company‘s motion, denied the Union‘s motion, and vacated 
the award. The Union timely appealed.  
 
II. 
 
  The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 301 
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‘s decision to vacate the 
arbitration award. Pa. Power Co. v. Local Union No. 272 of 
the Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 276 F.3d 174, 178 
(3d Cir. 2001). ―[W]e apply the same standard the district 
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court should have applied in reviewing the arbitration award.‖ 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen‘s Union, 73 F.3d 
1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Our review is 
quite narrow. If an ―arbitrator‘s award ‗draws its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement,‘ and is not merely 
‗his own brand of industrial justice,‘ the award is legitimate.‖ 
United Paperworkers Int‘l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 
484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. 
v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)). As 
this Court stated 44 years ago: 
 
[A] labor arbitrator‘s award does draw its 
essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement if the interpretation can in any 
rational way be derived from the agreement, 
viewed in the light of its language, its context, 
and any other indicia of the parties‘ intention. 
 
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 
(3d Cir. 1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Indeed, a reviewing court may disturb an arbitrator‘s 
award ―only where there is a manifest disregard of the 
agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract 
construction and the law of the shop.‖ Id.; see also Brentwood 
Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 396 F.3d 237, 
241 (3d Cir. 2005); Major League Umpires Ass‘n v. Am. 
League of Prof‘l Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 
2004); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen‘s Union, 993 
F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993); Virgin Islands Nursing Ass‘n‘s 
Bargaining Unit v. Schneider, 668 F.2d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 
1981). The Supreme Court has phrased the same idea in this 
fashion: ―if an arbitrator is even arguably construing or 
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applying the contract and acting within the scope of his 
authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed 
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.‖ Major 
League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 
(2001) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). The Garvey Court stated that arbitration awards 
may be unenforceable ―only when the arbitrator strays from 
interpretation and application of the agreement and 
effectively ‗dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice.‘‖ 
Id. (quoting Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597). 
 
III. 
 
The overarching question presented to us here is 
whether the Arbitrator‘s award draws its essence from the 
CBA. The Union insists that it does; the Company argues, in 
total agreement with the District Court, that it does not.  
 
The District Court concluded that the Arbitrator‘s 
award did not draw its essence from the CBA, after 
determining that the plain language of CBA Sections 3 and 9 
gave the Company the exclusive right to direct and schedule 
its workforce. In addition, the Court concluded that because 
the Arbitrator‘s award did not draw its essence from the CBA, 
the Arbitrator exceeded his authority when he relied on the 
alleged past practice of the Company.  
 
We regret we must disagree with both of the District 
Court‘s conclusions. When parties knowingly and voluntarily 
bargain for arbitration to resolve disputes, they receive the 
benefits of fast results and reduced dispute-resolution 
expenses. See Major League Umpires Ass‘n, 357 F.3d at 289. 
These benefits, however, do not come without risk, and ―the 
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possibility of receiving inconsistent or incorrect rulings 
without meaningful appellate review of the merits is one of 
the risks such parties must accept when they choose 
arbitration over litigation.‖ Id. In short, ―[i]t is the arbitrator‘s 
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the 
arbitrator‘s decision concerns construction of the contract, the 
courts have no business overruling him because their 
interpretation is different from his.‖ Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 
599.  
 
The District Court here erred in the same manner as 
the trial judge did in News America Publications, Inc. v. 
Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  Speaking for the Court was Chief Judge 
Higginbotham:  
 
As Judge Aldisert has observed, federal labor 
law elevates labor arbitrators to ―an exalted 
status.‖ Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 
405 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1969). . . . A court 
may not overrule an arbitrator simply because it 
disagrees with the arbitrator‘s construction of 
the contract,  . . . or because it believes its 
interpretation of the contract is better than that 
of the arbitrator. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. 
Local 759, International Union of the United 
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764, 103 S.Ct. 
2177, 2182, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983). 
 
News Am. Publ‘ns, 918 F.2d at 24. 
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Here, the Company accepted the risk of arbitration, 
and now seeks to avoid its result; we will not permit it to do 
so. 
 
IV. 
 
The Company contends that Sections 3 and 9 of the 
CBA unambiguously vested it with the exclusive right to 
schedule its employees. Citing Pennsylvania Power, it argues 
that the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the CBA and 
ignored the plain language of Sections 3 and 9, such that the 
award failed to draw its essence from the CBA. See Pa. 
Power Co., 276 F.3d at 178. The District Court agreed with 
the Company‘s contentions.  
 
This raises a critical threshold issue for our 
consideration: was the CBA so unambiguous as to the 
Company‘s right to schedule its workforce such that the 
Arbitrator‘s award, in which he inquired into past practice, 
manifestly disregarded the CBA?  This Court has stated that 
―extrinsic evidence of ‗past practice‘ could be admitted, if at 
all, only to resolve an ambiguity in the CBA.‖ Quick v. 
N.L.R.B., 245 F.3d 231, 247-248 (3d Cir. 2001). In support of 
this statement, Quick cited to U.A.W. Local 1697 v. Skinner 
Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999), which, quoting an 
opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
stated: 
 
Although extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
show that a written contract which looks clear is 
actually ambiguous, perhaps because the parties 
were using words in a special sense, . . . there 
must be either contractual language on which to 
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hang the label of ambiguous or some yawning 
void . . . that cries out for an implied term. 
Extrinsic evidence should not be used to add 
terms to a contract that is plausibly complete 
without them. 
 
Id. at 146 (quoting Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 
603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc)). 
 
This Court has also stated that ―[i]f the arbitrator‘s 
award has deviated from the plain meaning of a labor contract 
provision, it must find support in the contract itself or in prior 
practices demonstrating relaxation of the literal language.‖ 
NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 524 F.2d 756, 
759 (3d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (citing H.K. Porter Co. 
v. United Saw, File & Steel Prods. Workers of Am., 333 F.2d 
596 (3d Cir. 1964)).  
 
It cannot be disputed that the Arbitrator focused his 
analysis on whether Section 2‘s zipper clause precluded a 
finding of a past practice. As the District Court correctly 
noted, the Arbitrator never explicitly stated that Sections 3 
and 9 were ambiguous. In the view of the Company, the 
Arbitrator‘s failure to explicitly state that there was ambiguity 
in Sections 3 and 9, combined with the alleged clarity in the 
CBA that the Company had exclusive scheduling rights, 
precludes consideration of the effect of past practice. 
Although the District Court agreed with the Company, we do 
not. 
 
The pertinent portion of Section 3 states that ―[t]he 
Company retains the exclusive rights to manage the business 
and plant and to direct the working forces.‖ App. 29. The 
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Arbitrator cited to this provision in a section of the award 
entitled ―Contract Language,‖ but as the Company points out, 
he did not explicitly address the import of Section 3 in his 
analysis. Indeed, he only mentions Section 3 as it pertains to 
Section 2‘s zipper clause, stating that the zipper clause‘s 
language is not ―a specific affirmation that management 
rights are not limited by prior practices.‖ Id. at 91. 
Throughout the course of the dispute, from the submission of 
the first grievance through the arbitration hearing, the 
Company cited Section 3‘s management rights clause for the 
proposition that it had the right to schedule its workforce. As 
an example, the Company‘s first response to the Union‘s 
grievance stated that ―[t]he Company has the right to schedule 
under Section 3—MANAGEMENT page 4 of the Labor 
Agreement.‖ Id. at 66-67. The ―Position of the Company‖ 
presented at the arbitration hearing states that ―[o]ur 
management‘s rights clause includes the right to schedule.‖ 
Id. at 88. 
 
From our reading of Section 3‘s management rights 
clause, however, the right to schedule does not appear 
anywhere in that clause. It appears, therefore, to be 
understandable that the Arbitrator refused to accept the notion 
that the contents of Section 3 unambiguously resolved the 
dispute presented to him. It might have been preferable for 
the Arbitrator to state explicitly that Section 3 was 
ambiguous, therefore permitting him to address the past 
practice issue. His failure to do so does not by itself, however, 
require that the award be vacated. We note that ―[a]rbitrators 
have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an 
award.‖ Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598.  
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Before the District Court, and again before us, the 
Company relies heavily on the language of Section 9 of the 
CBA, entitled ―Hours of Work.‖ Nowhere in the ―Position of 
the Company‖ contained in the Arbitration award does it 
appear that the Company cited to or relied upon the 
provisions of Section 9. The Company did refer to Section 9 
in one of its responses to the Union‘s grievances, stating: 
―Section 9 D (C) page 20 does not mandate any monetary 
penalty for a failure to give a four hour notice. That section 
deals with a reporting allowance for a shift when the 
employee was not notified and actually reports for work.‖ 
App. 70. The parties appear to agree that this reference by the 
Company was actually to Section 9B(1), which states that 
―[i]f an employee is requested to report to work outside his 
regularly scheduled workweek and whether or not work is 
available he shall receive a minimum of 4 hours reporting pay 
at the employee‘s applicable rate of pay.‖ Id. at 38.  
 
According to the Company, the critical language of 
Section 9B(1) is ―[i]f an employee is requested to work 
outside his regularly scheduled workweek.‖  Brief of 
Appellee 15.  Section 9A(1) defines a ―normal workweek‖ as 
―40 hours per week, scheduled on five successive days, from 
Monday through Friday, inclusive.‖ App. 38. From this the 
Company contends that this language unambiguously bestows 
upon it an exclusive right to schedule. Again, we disagree.  
 
First, we note that the Company misquotes the CBA, 
which actually states ―[i]f an employee is requested to report 
to work outside his regularly scheduled workweek . . . .‖ Id. 
(emphasis added). More importantly, this interpretation of 
Section 9 was never put before the Arbitrator. Even if it had 
been, the language is not so unambiguous as to compel a 
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finding that the Company had the exclusive right to schedule 
employees for weekend work. Language discussing 
compensation for employees who are asked to report—and 
upon reporting find that their services are not needed that 
day—simply is not the equivalent of a clear statement that the 
Company has an exclusive right to schedule.  
 
Even accepting the Company‘s argument that the 
CBA‘s plain meaning gives it the exclusive right to schedule, 
the Arbitrator would have been justified in deviating from 
that plain meaning because prior to the CBA‘s existence, 
Lubik was allowed to work whenever the maintenance 
department worked. This constitutes a ―prior practice[] 
demonstrating relaxation of the literal language.‖ See NF&M 
Corp., 524 F.2d at 759.
1
 As we discuss below, the Arbitrator 
determined that the CBA‘s zipper clause did not bar 
establishment of a prior practice, notwithstanding the 
Company‘s protestations.  
 
We conclude, therefore, that the CBA was not so free 
of ambiguity regarding the Company‘s exclusive right to 
                                              
1
 We note that this is in tension with this Court‘s 
pronouncement in Quick that ―extrinsic evidence of ‗past 
practice‘ could be admitted, if at all, only to resolve an 
ambiguity in the CBA.‖ Quick, 245 F.3d at 247-248. The 
Union contends that Quick and Skinner Engine are 
distinguishable because they were not cases where this Court 
was asked to review an arbitration award. Although we need 
not decide it here, given that we disagree with the District 
Court‘s conclusion that the CBA unambiguously gives the 
Company exclusive scheduling rights, the Union persuasively 
distinguishes those cases. 
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schedule its workforce such that the Arbitrator‘s inquiry into 
past practice and introduction of extrinsic evidence were not 
permissible. Our inquiry, however, does not end there. We 
still must determine whether the award draws its essence from 
the CBA.  
 
V. 
 
The Union maintains that a past practice both could be 
and was established, notwithstanding the zipper clause in 
Section 2 of the CBA. As discussed previously, the Company 
contended throughout the dispute that the clarity of Section 3 
precluded use of past practice to ―undo or supersede clear 
contract language.‖ App. 67. The Company contended also 
that Section 2‘s zipper clause required any agreements to be 
put in writing and signed by the Union designate and the 
Company. Id. We will defer to the Arbitrator‘s ultimate 
conclusion that a past practice both could be and had been 
established. 
 
The Company and the District Court faulted the 
Arbitrator for formulating the issue presented to him as 
follows: ―Did the Parties to the Agreement as alleged in 
Grievance No. 2-2009 establish, by their actions in the year 
2008, an unwritten past practice and did the Company violate 
this past practice? If the answer is yes, what is the remedy?‖ 
Id. at 84. We agree with the Company that the Union 
exaggerates its position when it states that, ―as directed by the 
Company, the Arbitrator focused on CBA Section 2, the 
purported ‗zipper clause.‘‖ Brief of Appellant 22 (emphasis 
added). Although the Company did indeed stipulate that the 
case included three grievances all involving the same issue, 
we believe that the Company was merely acknowledging that 
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all three grievances contained the same allegations regarding 
the Company‘s failure to schedule Lubik for weekend work. 
This acknowledgment is not the same as stipulating that the 
Arbitrator was only to consider whether a past practice could 
be established under the CBA, and more specifically under 
Section 2.  
 
Nevertheless, ―the deference that is accorded to an 
arbitrator‘s interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement should also be accorded to an arbitrator‘s 
interpretation of the issue submitted.‖ Major League Umpires 
Ass‘n, 357 F.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). The Arbitrator considered the contentions of the 
parties, the evidence presented, and the history of the dispute 
between the Union and the Company. He then determined 
that he was required to decide whether the parties established 
a past practice by their actions in 2008, and whether that past 
practice was violated. From the presentation of the parties‘ 
respective positions at the arbitration hearing, it appears that 
both the Union and the Company focused on whether a past 
practice could exist under the CBA, and specifically on 
whether Section 2‘s zipper clause precluded introduction of 
past practice into the CBA. Tellingly, the Company submitted 
only one non-joint exhibit during the arbitration hearing, a 
handwritten document entitled ―Saturdays N. Lubik Did Not 
Work.‖ App. 83. Accordingly, we defer to the Arbitrator‘s 
determination that the issue presented was whether a past 
practice had been established and violated. 
 
 In the award‘s ―Discussion on the Merits,‖ the 
Arbitrator discussed, at some length, the process by which a 
past practice can become established, and he found that a 
binding past practice had in fact been established. He 
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addressed the Company‘s contention that its Section 2 zipper 
clause precluded establishment of a past practice without a 
written agreement. The Arbitrator considered the Company‘s 
interpretation of the zipper clause, and stated: 
 
This language does not acknowledge that the 
written contract constitutes the parties‘ entire 
agreement, is not explicit with regard to a 
waiver of the right to bargain about other 
conditions, nor is it a specific affirmation that 
management rights are not limited by prior 
practices.  
 
Id. at 91. 
 
Throughout the Arbitrator‘s discussion, he emphasized 
that the past practice began before the adoption of the CBA 
and continued thereafter, and it appears that he believed this 
provided further support for the proposition that the 
Company‘s zipper clause was not dispositive. Accordingly, 
we defer also to the Arbitrator‘s conclusion that a binding 
past practice had been established. 
 
The sine qua non of judicial review of an arbitration 
award is a heavy degree of deference to the arbitrator. And 
here the role of both a District Court and a Court of Appeals 
is far different than that of a District Court reviewing a 
decision of a Bankruptcy Court or a Court of Appeals 
reviewing a bench trial award. Arbitration is all about 
―private court adjudication,‖ and the use of arbitration has 
been rapidly increasing over the years and shows no signs of 
slowing. Arbitration procedures themselves have a lengthy 
history, with law merchant origins in medieval Europe and 
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elsewhere. At bottom, arbitration is a kind of settlement 
technique in which a third party reviews the case and imposes 
a decision that is legally binding on both parties. It is 
designed to be faster and cheaper than resolving a matter in 
the trial courts, and it should not be subject to a lengthy and 
expensive judicial review.  
 
A half century past, this Court made clear in Ludwig 
Honold that an award draws its essence from the CBA if it 
can be derived from the Agreement in any rational way, and 
that a reviewing court may disturb only those awards 
demonstrating a manifest disregard of the Agreement. 405 
F.2d at 1128. In view of the previous discussion of 
ambiguities in the CBA‘s language, and applying the 
teachings of Ludwig Honold, we conclude here that the 
Arbitrator‘s interpretation draws its essence from the CBA, 
and that the Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the CBA. 
Accordingly, the District Court should not have disturbed the 
award.  
 
* * * * * 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed 
and an Order issued to enforce the Arbitrator‘s award. 
